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How Does Artificial Intelligence Pose an Existential Risk? 
 




The idea that AI might one day threaten humanity has been around for 
some time. In 1863, the novelist Samuel Butler (1863 ,185) suggested 
that machines may one day hold “supremacy over the world and its 
inhabitants”. By the mid-twentieth century, these concerns had left the 
realm of science fiction, as thinkers like Alan Turing (1951, 260) began 
to warn the public that we should expect intelligent machines to 
eventually “take control”. Still, for many years, academics did not spill 
much ink over these concerns, even while Hollywood filmmakers ran 
with them, producing countless blockbusters based on this “AI takeover” 
scenario (think: The Terminator or Battlestar Galactica). Over the last 
decade or so, however, many leading academics and entrepreneurs have 
notably increased their attention to existential risks from AI. These 
concerns are, as we will see, more subtle than those depicted in crude 
Hollywood-produced AI takeover scenarios. Indeed, those depictions 
have largely misrepresented the concrete issues scholars are concerned 
with by overly focusing on anthropomorphic concerns of conscious AI 
systems deciding to destroy humans.  
This renewed scholarly interest in AI safety has been spurred on 
in part by the recent deep learning revolution. This period is defined by 
major advances in the accomplishments of deep neural networks—
artificial neural networks with multiple layers between the input and 
output layers—across a wide range of areas, including game-playing, 
speech and facial recognition, and image generation. Even with these 
breakthroughs though, the cognitive capabilities of current AI systems 
remain limited to domain-specific applications. Nevertheless, many 
researchers are alarmed by the speed of progress in AI and worry that 
future systems, if not managed correctly, could present an existential 
threat.  
Despite the renewed interest in this concern, there remains 
substantial disagreement over both the nature and the likelihood of the 
existential threats posed by AI. Hence, our aim in this chapter is to 
explicate the main arguments that have been given for thinking that AI 
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does pose an existential risk, and to point out where there are 
disagreements and weakness in these arguments. The chapter has the 
following structure: in §2, we will introduce the concept of existential 
risk, the sources of such risks, and how these risks are typically assessed. 
In §3–5, we will critically examine three commonly cited reasons for 
thinking that AI poses an existential threat to humanity: the control 
problem, global disruption from an AI “arms race”, and the 
weaponization of AI. Our focus is on the first of these three, because it 
represents a kind of existential risk that is novel to AI as technology. 
While the latter two are equally important, they have commonalities with 
other kinds of technologies (e.g., nuclear weapons) discussed in the 
literature on existential risk, and so we will dedicate less time to them. 
 
 
2. What Is an Existential Risk? 
 
Many people believe that existential risks (henceforth, Xrisks) are the 
greatest threats facing humanity. And whilst there is much common 
ground amongst scholars about which scenarios constitute an Xrisk—the 
most commonly cited example is extinction risks1—there is not as much 
consensus on the precise definition of the concept (Beard et al., 2020; 
Torres, 2019). While most Xrisk scholars agree that a risk is existential if 
an adverse outcome would bring about human extinction, few endorse 
the narrower view that a risk is existential only if it would cause this 
outcome.2 Most definitions of Xrisk are broader, including at times the 
risk of global civilizational collapse (Rees, 2003; Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2017); 
scenarios in which the technological and moral potential of humanity is 
“permanently and drastically” curtailed (Bostrom, 2002, 2013); and 
suffering risks, defined as cases in which “an adverse outcome would 
bring about severe suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding 
 
1 Extinction risks are those that directly cause the extinction of the human species or less 
directly lead to circumstances that cause our extinction (e.g., through habitat 
destruction). (See discussions in Matheny, 2007; Bostrom, 2013; and Cotton-Barratt et 
al., 2020.)  
2 Moynihan (2020) is the only example we found of someone using this narrow 
definition. C.f. Sotala & Gloor (2017) and Torres (2019), who both claim that the 
narrow definition is most common.  
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all suffering that has existed on Earth so far” (Sotala & Gloor, 2017, 
389).  
Xrisks are typically distinguished from the broader category of 
global catastrophic risks. Bostrom (2013), for example, uses two 
dimensions—scope and severity—to make this distinction. Scope refers 
to the number of people at risk, while severity refers to how badly the 
population in question would be affected (ibid, 16). Xrisks are at the most 
extreme end of both of these spectrums: they are pan-generational in 
scope (i.e., “affecting humanity over all, or almost all, future 
generations”), and they are the severest kinds of threats, causing either 
“death or a permanent and drastic reduction of quality of life” (ibid, 17). 
Perhaps the clearest example of an Xrisk is an asteroid impact on the 
scale of that which hit the Earth 66 million years ago, wiping out the 
dinosaurs (Schulte et al., 2010; Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2017). Global 
catastrophic risks, by way  of contrast, could be either just as severe but 
narrower in scope, or just as broad but less severe. Some examples 
include the destruction of cultural heritage, thinning of the ozone layer, 
or even a large-scale pandemic outbreak (Bostrom, 2013). In this chapter, 
we will focus mostly on the least controversial category of Xrisks—
extinction risks—but will also at times discuss some of the other 
scenarios mentioned.   
 
2.1      Sources of Xrisk 
 
For most of human history, the only source of Xrisks facing humanity 
were natural causes, such as an asteroid hitting Earth or a global 
pandemic (Bostrom, 2002). But the creation of the first atomic bomb in 
1945 introduced a new source of existential threat to humanity, one that 
was anthropogenic in nature. But since then, humanity has created 
numerous other kinds of threats to our own existence, including human-
caused climate change, global biodiversity loss, biological warfare, and 
threats from artificial intelligence, for example. In fact, it is widely 
thought that most Xrisks today are anthropogenic and that, as a result of 
these new threats, this current century is the riskiest one that humanity 
has ever faced (Rees, 2003; Bostrom, 2013; Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2017; Ord, 
2020).  
Not all of these threats pose straightforward Xrisks. Let’s 
consider an extinction scenario to be the existential outcome in question, 
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and then take nuclear fallout as an example. Today, the worldwide 
arsenal of nuclear weapons could lead to unprecedented death tolls and 
habitat destruction and, hence, it poses a clear global catastrophic risk. 
Still, experts assign a relatively low probability to human extinction from 
nuclear warfare (Martin, 1982; Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008; Shulman, 
2012). This is in part because it seems more likely that extinction, if it 
follows at all, would occur indirectly from the effects of the war, rather 
than directly. This distinction has appeared in several discussions on 
Xrisks (e.g., Matheny, 2007, Liu et al., 2018; Zwetsloot & Dafoe, 2019), 
but it is made most explicitly in Cotton-Barratt et al. (2020, 6), who 
explain that a global catastrophe that causes human extinction can do so 
either directly by “killing everyone”, or indirectly, by “removing our 
ability to continue flourishing over a longer period.” A nuclear explosion 
itself is unlikely to kill everyone directly, but the resulting effects it has 
on the Earth could lead to lands becoming uninhabitable, in turn leading 
to a scarcity of essential resources, which could (over a number of years) 
lead to human extinction. Some of the simplest examples of direct risks 
of human extinction, by way of contrast, are “[i]f the entire planet is 
struck by a deadly gamma ray burst, or enough of a deadly toxin is 
dispersed through the atmosphere” (ibid, 6). What’s critical here is that 
for an Xrisk to be direct it has to be able to reach everyone. 
Much like nuclear fallout, the arguments for why and how AI 
poses an Xrisk are not straightforward. This is partly because AI is a 
general-purpose technology. It has a wide range of potential uses, for a 
wide range of actors, across a wide range of sectors. In this chapter, we 
are interested in the extent to which the use or misuse of AI can play a 
sine qua non role in Xrisk scenarios, across any of these domains. We are 
interested not only in current AI capabilities, but also in future (potential) 
capabilities. Depending on how the technology develops, AI could pose 
either a direct or indirect risk, although we make the case that direct 
Xrisks from AI are even more improbable than indirect ones. Another 
helpful way of thinking about AI risks is to divide them into accidental 
risks, structural risks, or misuse risks (Zwetsloot & Dafoe, 2019). In §3, 
we focus on accidental risks: threats arising from the system behaving in 
unintended ways. In §4, we turn to structural risks: threats arising from 
how the technology shapes the broader environment, especially in the 
political and military realms, in ways that can elevate risk. And finally, in 
§5, we examine potential misuses of AI.  
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Before moving on, it is worth noting that there are some 
significant methodological challenges that confront the study of Xrisks. 
Because events that constitute or precipitate an Xrisk are unprecedented, 
arguments to the effect that they pose such a threat must be theoretical in 
nature. Their rarity also makes it such that any speculations about how or 
when such events might occur are subjective and not empirically 
verifiable (Sagan, 1983; Matheny, 2007; Beard, et al. 2020), which 
makes such claims challenging to submit to standard forms of risk 
analysis (Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2017). Despite these challenges, however, it is 
still important to try to distinguish which extreme scenarios are actually 
plausible and worthy of further attention, even if they have an extremely 
low probability, as opposed to those that can be dismissed as science 
fiction (ibid, 3-4). Accordingly, our goal in this chapter is not to assign 
probabilities to arguments that AI poses an Xrisk, but rather to assess 
their theoretical nature. 
 
 
3. The Control Problem Argument for Xrisk 
 
The earliest line of thinking that AI poses an Xrisk warns that AI might 
become both powerful and indifferent to human values, leading to 
dangerous consequences for human beings. Despite it being a 
longstanding concern, the structure of this argument is rarely, if ever, 
explicitly laid out.3 By presenting the control problem argument for Xrisk 
(henceforth CPAX) in this way, our aim is to capture what we understand 
to be the line of reasoning while also making the epistemic moves more 
explicit.  
CPAX rests on two central theses: the Orthogonality Thesis and 
the Instrumental Convergence Thesis, both of which were first explicitly 
articulated by Bostrom (2012, 130-132; 2014).  
 
Orthogonality Thesis: The intelligent capacities of any system are 
logically independent from any goals the system might have. 
 
 
3 Bostrom (2014) and Russell (2019) each have a book-length defence of these issues, 
but neither lay out CPAX in an explicit way. The closest examples we found were 
Chalmers (2010) and Danaher (2015). Here, we draw from all of these sources.  
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Instrumental Convergence Thesis: Almost any intelligent system 
is likely to converge upon certain instrumental (sub)goals. 
 
We will discuss each of these theses, as well as the premises and central 
inferences of the argument (below) in §3.1–§3.4. 
 
P1. It is possible to build an AI system that has a decisive 
strategic advantage over all other forms of intelligence.  
 
P2. If an AI system has a decisive strategic advantage over human 
intelligence, then we may not be able to control that system. 
 
C1. It is possible to build an AI system that we are not able to 
control (from P1 and P2). 
 
P3. The intelligent capacities of an AI system are logically 
independent from any goals the system might have (supported by 
the Orthogonality Thesis).  
 
C2. Therefore, it is possible to build an AI system that human 
beings are not able to control and that has goals that do not align 
with human values (from C1 and P3). 
 
P4. AI systems are likely to converge upon certain instrumental 
(sub)goals that are inimical to human interests (supported by the 
Instrumental Convergence Thesis). 
 
C3. It is possible to build AI systems that pose an existential 
threat to humanity (from C2 and P4). 
 
This reconstruction of the argument is by no means uncontroversial, and 
we will discuss some of the disagreements and objections as we go 
through the argument.  
 
3.1 Intelligence Explosion and Decisive Strategic Advantages  
 
P1 states that it is possible to build an AI system that has a decisive 
strategic advantage over all other forms of intelligence (including human 
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intelligence). Historically, CPAX was introduced as arising from an 
intelligence explosion that would lead to the creation of a superintelligent 
AI—a system that by definition has a decisive strategic advantage over 
human intelligence. More recently, some have argued that an intelligence 
explosion is not the only pathway to AI gaining a decisive strategic 
advantage. We will begin by explaining the pathway to a loss of control 
over AI (C1) from an intelligence explosion (in this section, §3.1) and 
consider some potential objections (§3.1.1). We will then, in §3.2, 
discuss P2 and some more contemporary takes on how C1 could result. 
An intelligence explosion is a hypothetical event in which an AI 
system enters a rapid cycle of recursive self-improvement, whereby each 
new iteration creates a more intelligent version of itself, culminating in 
the creation of a superintelligence. Here, a superintelligence is “any 
intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in 
virtually all domains of interest” (Bostrom 2014, 22). The concept of an 
intelligence explosion was first articulated by I.J. Good (1965, 33), who 
argued that an AI system whose intelligence exceeds humanity’s in all 
intellectual activities would necessarily also exceed it in terms of 
designing machine intelligence. Hence, if such a system were initially 
engineered by humans, it would possess the capability to design a 
machine more intelligent than itself. The subsequent new iteration, being 
more intelligent than its predecessor, would by the same logic also be 
capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. If each new 
generation of AI were to utilize its improved design capability, an 
intelligence explosion would occur (Chalmers, 2010). 
Importantly, an intelligence explosion need not begin with the 
creation of a machine with greater than human intelligence, as Good’s 
argument suggests. In principle, it could be sparked via the creation of a 
more modest type of machine intelligence. Some might hold, for 
example, that an intelligence explosion merely requires a system with 
artificial general intelligence, where general intelligence is the ability to 
deploy the same core suite of cognitive resources to complete a wide 
range of different tasks (Shevlin et al., 2019). An even more modest 
possibility is that an intelligence explosion could spark from a mere 
artificial narrow intelligence, that is, a system that excels only at specific 
tasks and lacks the ability to use its resources to solve problems outside 
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of its narrow domains.4 Bostrom (2014, 29), for example, suggests that a 
system “capable of improving its own architecture”, what he calls a 
“seed AI”, would be a sufficient starting point. For example, DeepMind’s 
AlphaZero, a current narrow AI system, has already shown the capacity 
to iteratively self-improve by repeatedly playing against itself. This 
illustrates how, under certain conditions, this process of recursive self-
improvement might generate an intelligence explosion that begins from a 
mere narrow AI, in particular, any narrow AI system that enjoys a 
decisive strategic advantage (i.e., well above human level capacity) in 
some relevant domains, coupled with sufficient capacities for real-world 
modification.5,6  
 
3.1.1 Objections to the Possibility of an Intelligence Explosion 
 
In this section, we consider two objections to the possibility of an 
intelligence explosion. 
 
Objection one: Why think that an AI system would recursively self-
improve just because it had the capacity to do so?7 Indeed, it seems 
logically possible that even if a system could design a more intelligent 
iteration of itself, that it would not take this action. More broadly, some 
have argued that superintelligent AI systems would be “inextricably 
unpredictable”, and hence there is nothing that can be said regarding their 
potential goals (Cortese, 2014).  
 
 
4 This final possibility is more modest in the sense that it would require less 
advancement in current technology as a starting point for the argument. This is because, 
while we currently have many sophisticated narrow AI systems, which outperform 
humans in certain tasks (e.g. playing chess or go), we do not yet have any general AI 
systems, and many scholars hypothesize that we are a long ways from developing these 
(e.g. Dignum, 2019). 
5 Here we distinguish our use of the phrase “decisive strategic advantage” from that of 
Bostrom’s (2014, 78), who defines it as “a level of technological and other advantages 
sufficient to enable it to achieve complete world domination”. 
6 AlphaZero, to be sure, could not spark an intelligence explosion, as it has neither a 
decisive strategic advantage in a relevant domain nor does it have sufficient capacities 
for real-world modification. 
7 We have bracketed those cases in which an AI system is deliberately engineered to 
recursively self-improve, as it straightforwardly follows that it would do so under these 
conditions. 
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Reply: In order to make meaningful predictions regarding what a 
sufficiently advanced AI would do (e.g., whether it would recursively 
self-improve), we need a method of identifying what goals it might have. 
Yet, the Orthogonality Thesis (which we discuss in more detail below) 
holds that the intelligent capacities of an AI system are logically 
independent from any goals the system might have. If true, the range of 
possible goals that an AI system could have is enormous. In light of this, 
how do we make predictions? Omohundro (2008, 1) argues that any 
sufficiently advanced AI is likely to have several basic “drives”, or 
“tendencies which will be present unless explicitly counteracted”. 
Bostrom (2014, 109) similarly argues that we can make robust inferences 
regarding the sub-goals of almost any intelligent agent by appealing to 
the thesis of instrumental convergence: 
 
“Several instrumental values can be identified 
which are convergent in the sense that their 
attainment would increase the chances of the 
agent’s goal being realized for a wide range of 
final goals and a wide range of situations, 
implying that these instrumental values are likely 
to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated 
intelligent agents.”  
 
Both Omohundro and Bostrom identify self-improvement as one of the 
“basic drives” or “instrumental values” (respectively) that a system 
would pursue. They also share the same general reasoning: improvements 
in rationality and intelligence are likely to be pursued by a wide variety 
of intelligent agents insofar as they tend to improve an agent’s decision-
making capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of that agent 
realizing whatever final objective it has (Bostrom 2014, 111). Taken 
together, the Bostrom-Omohundro thesis suggests that an AI system 
would have instrumental reasons to undergo a process of recursive self-
improvement, especially cognitive self-improvement, and thus would be 
driven to do so. 
 
Objection two: Despite the aforementioned reasons for thinking that a 
sufficiently intelligent AI system would be motivated to recursively self-
improve, there are some who question whether an intelligence explosion 
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is an inevitable outcome of the creation of such a system. Yoshua 
Bengio, for example, speculates that for mathematical and computational 
reasons there may be a “wall-of-complexity” that confronts all forms of 
intelligence “due to exponentially growing complexities” and that limits 
the capacities of any intelligent agent (quoted in Sofge, 2015). He 
speculates that this “wall” might (partly) explain why animals with 
bigger brains than ours are not more intelligent than us. Meanwhile, 
Chalmers (2010, 19-22) argues that a number of obstacles could arise that 
forestall an intelligence explosion. Among these are what he terms 
“manifestation obstacles”—difficulties which obstruct self-amplifying 
capabilities from developing.8 He further subdivides these into two types 
of defeaters: motivational and situational. Motivational defeaters include 
disinclination and active prevention. For example, an AI system might 
discover that self-improvement(s) come at a cost which outweighs the 
associated gains, as would be the case if it turns out that improvements in 
intelligence have diminishing returns.9 Alternatively, we might design the 
AI system to lack the motivation to self-improve, or to have a contrary 
motivation which supersedes it (ibid).10 As for situational defeaters, these 
include unfavourable circumstances, such as a limitation to the 
availability of resources necessary for cognitive upgrades (ibid).  
 
Reply: A defender of CPAX has to make the case that it is unlikely for 
these defeaters to be present, or at the very least, that there is a non-zero 
chance they will be absent. But, we think Chalmers (2010, 19) is right in 
writing that there are no “knockdown arguments against any of these 
obstacles”. As with the previous objection, both sides of this issue 
confront the same challenge: that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
predict what the motivations of a future advanced AI system could be.11 
 
8 Chalmers also identifies two other types of obstacles—structural obstacles and 
correlation obstacles.  
9 See further discussion in Russell (2019). 
10 By “motivations”, we don’t mean to attribute intentional agency, but rather “agency” 
in a kind of Dennettian sense (i.e., following the intentional stance). We mean 
motivations as something like “sub-goals”, or the strategies a system will undertake to 
achieve its final goals. 
11 Consider another scenario, discussed by Tegmark (2014) and Häggström (2019), in 
which an advanced AI is programmed to have a meaningless or “undefined” goal. What 
would happen in this case? Häggström predicts that all instrumental goals would also 
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Ultimately, an intelligence explosion is certainly not an inevitable 
outcome, but it also is not an impossible one. Chalmers (2010, 22) takes 
a similar position, saying that it is “far from obvious that there will be 
defeaters”, and in their absence, the outcome of an intelligence explosion 
would be the creation of a superintelligence.  
 
3.2 Losing Control (P2 and C1) 
 
If we take as true the supposition that humanity’s control over other 
Earth-bound species is largely the result of our comparative intelligence 
advantage, then the emergence of an AI system with a decisive strategic 
advantage over human intelligence should give cause for concern. 
Consider the current power structure between human beings and gorillas. 
Bostrom (2014, vii) argues that due to our advantage in general 
intelligence “the fate of the gorilla now depends more on us humans than 
on the gorillas themselves”. Russell (2019, 134) makes a similar point, 
noting that by virtue of our intelligence, gorillas “essentially have no 
future beyond that which we deign to allow”. Both authors, among others 
(e.g., Hawking, 2018), raise the worry that, in much the same way, the 
destiny of humanity could be dictated by the actions of a superintelligent 
AI. This “gorilla problem”, as Russell terms it, is the idea behind P2, 
which states that if an AI system has a decisive strategic advantage over 
human intelligence, then we may not be able to control that system.  
There are a few reasons for thinking that we will not be able to 
control systems that are more intelligent than us. Among these are the 
opacity and unpredictability of such systems. A good example of these 
features in a non-critical domain is DeepMind’s AlphaGo—which in 
2016 beat the 18-time world champion of Go, Lee Sedol. In the games 
against Sedol, the system sometimes made moves that proved 
advantageous but that both the engineers of the system and human Go 
experts alike did not foresee and struggled to interpret (Silver et al., 2016; 
Kohs, 2017). The opaqueness and unpredictability of these systems 
makes them potentially dangerous—if even experts cannot predict or 
interpret how a system will behave, it could run amok sooner than we 
realize and before we have a chance to intervene. Hence, it follows from 
the first two premises that we could risk losing control over what a 
 
then become pointless, in which case “all predictions” from the instrumental 
convergence thesis “collapse”.  
This chapter is forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, Ed. 
C. Veliz. 2021. Please cite as ‘forthcoming’ or cite the published version.  
12 
strategically advantaged AI system does (C1). The possibility of this 
occurring is often referred to as the control problem. But, for this 
problem to pose an Xrisk, a few more premises are needed.  
Before continuing on, however, we should note two things. First, 
notice that nothing so far, or going forward, in the discussion of CPAX 
relies on the idea that an AI system would need human-like motivations. 
This is important to clarify because some critics object that CPAX relies 
on erroneous anthropomorphic assumptions about AI (e.g., Andrew Ng 
(Williams, 2015) and Yann LeCun (Wakefield, 2015)). But the central 
idea so far is that an AI might cause harm for instrumental reasons, or 
that it might have little regard for human life or have that regard 
outweighed by other concerns. Hawking (2018, 188) explains:  
 
“[T]he real risk with AI isn’t malice, but competence. … You’re 
probably not an evil ant-hater who steps on ants out of malice, but 
if you’re in charge of a hydroelectric green-energy project and 
there’s an anthill in the region to be flooded, too bad for the ants. 
Let’s not place humanity in the position of those ants.”  
 
In other words, CPAX need not assume that an AI would develop 
malicious aims or choose to destroy humanity because of human-like 
emotions, such as disgust, revenge, or anger. It also does not assume the 
AI in question would be conscious, or even that it would become (non-
consciously) motivated to harm or exterminate human beings.  
 The second thing to note is that, while early concerns around the 
control problem (that is, premises P1 and P2, leading up to C1) focused 
on the possibility of an intelligence explosion, more recent discussions 
have moved away from this scenario. In other words, it has been argued 
that a loss of control (i.e., C1) could result without an intelligence 
explosion and without the emergence of a superintelligent AI. An AI 
system might not require an internal “drive” to self-improve, for 
example, if human beings are incentivized to aid its improvement 
(Drexler, 2019). It also may not need to reach the level of 
superintelligence in order to pose an Xrisk (ibid). Russell (2019, 137) 
explains that humanity has thus far been protected from the “potentially 
catastrophic consequences” of AI because of the limited intelligent 
capacities of current AI systems and their limited abilities to bring about 
changes in the real world (most systems operate in virtual worlds or lab 
This chapter is forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, Ed. 
C. Veliz. 2021. Please cite as ‘forthcoming’ or cite the published version.  
13 
environments). But as narrow AI systems become more cognitively 
sophisticated and are given more capacity to directly affect or modify the 
world, they could pose an Xrisk as long as their narrow domain is critical 
enough (e.g., controlling stock markets or military decision-making) and 
their interests are inimical to those of humans. 
 
3.3 The Orthogonality Thesis (P3 and C2) 
 
In one of the earliest explanations of the control problem, Norbert Weiner 
(1960, 1358) worried there could be dangerous outcomes if a powerful 
AI system that we lacked control over were to operate with an incorrect 
objective: “If we use, to achieve our purposes, a mechanical agency with 
whose operation we cannot efficiently interfere… we had better be quite 
sure that the purpose put into the machine is the purpose which we really 
desire and not merely a colourful imitation of it.” Consider an example 
that Russell (2019, 138) gives of a machine tasked with solving 
environmental problems:  
 
 “[Y]ou might ask the machine to counter the rapid acidification 
of the oceans that results from higher carbon dioxide levels. The 
machine develops a new catalyst that facilitates an incredibly 
rapid chemical reaction between ocean and atmosphere and 
restores the oceans’ pH levels. Unfortunately, a quarter of the 
oxygen in the atmosphere is used up in the process leaving us to 
asphyxiate slowly and painfully. Oops.”  
 
In this case, the Xrisk arises from incidental safety issues that fall out of 
misaligned objectives. Bostrom (2014, 97) offers a similar example of an 
AI that might “tile all of the Earth’s surface with solar panels, nuclear 
reactors, supercomputing facilities with protruding cooling towers, space 
rocket launchers, or other installations whereby the AI intends to 
maximize the long-term cumulative realization of its values.” Once 
again, the threat to humanity here is essentially a side effect of the 
widespread habitat destruction that would ensue.12 Because AI is a 
general-purpose technology, the misalignment problem could arise in 
 
12 These are two of many possible hypothetical scenarios of how powerful AIs with 
misaligned objectives could be Xrisks. See Shanahan (2015) and Tegmark (2017) for 
further examples.  
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many different domains, though Xrisks seem most likely to occur in 
domains with global impact (because they are by definition pan-
generational in scope).   
For some, the idea that a superintelligent machine would pursue 
such narrow goals without regard to broader consequences seems 
improbable, if not “self-refuting” (Pinker, 2019; other critics include 
Loosemore, 2012; Chorost, 2016; Metzinger, 2017). Loosemore (2012) 
has dubbed it the “fallacy of dumb superintelligence”. While Chorost 
(2016), responding to Bostrom’s scenario, argues that “By the time [a 
superintelligent AI] is in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar 
panels, it’ll know that it would be morally wrong to do so.” Metzinger 
(2017) makes this same claim, arguing that because a superintelligence 
would be better than human beings at moral cognition it would also be 
benevolent.13 But the possibility that a highly intelligent artificial agent 
could act in ways that are malevolent or misaligned with the values of its 
designers is meant to follow from Bostrom’s Orthogonality Thesis, 
which maintains that the intelligent capacities of any system are logically 
independent from any goals the system might have. By “intelligent 
capacities” here, Bostrom (2012, 74) means the capacities related to 
instrumental rationality, e.g., “skill at prediction, planning, and means-
ends reasoning in general”. This Orthogonality Thesis is meant to apply 
quite broadly to any intelligent system, including humans. And Hume’s 
(1739) longstanding is-ought problem lends support for the idea: if one 
cannot infer normative statements from descriptive ones, then however 
intelligent a system is, it may never arrive at any moral facts (Bostrom, 
2012, 74; Armstrong, 2013). The Orthogonality Thesis supports the third 
premise of CPAX, and with C1, it leads by conjunction to the second 
conclusion, C2: that it is possible to build an uncontrollable AI system 
that has goals that do not align with human values. 
 
3.3.1 The Value Alignment Problem 
 
Arguably, one way to avoid C2 would be to program the AI to ensure 
that it is benevolent or that its values are reliably aligned with our own. 
After all, humans have the advantage of being the ones who build the 
system and determine its initial goals (Bostrom, 2014; Russell, 2019). 
 
13 We could not find any scholarly publications in which Loosemore or Metzinger make 
these points, so in both cases we cite online articles. 
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Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. This is widely known as the value 
alignment problem (see Gabriel & Ghazavi, this volume). The problem is 
hard for many reasons.  
First, there is the issue of identifying human values. Human 
beings are often confused and conflicted about our own values, and 
different cultures seem to have wide variation between their respective 
values.14 While pervasive moral disagreement does not necessarily imply 
value relativism, it does complicate the challenge of trying to build 
machines that align with “our” values, as it opens the door to value 
pluralism (the view that there are many different and sometimes 
irreducible moral values). While a value monist has the challenge of 
identifying the one value (e.g., happiness or pleasure) that all other values 
reduce to, the value pluralist has the problem of identifying and 
implementing the complete set of irreducible values. This is a real 
challenge for programming; as Russell (2019, 139) notes, one of the most 
common forms of value misalignment comes from an incomplete 
articulation of values, that is, from omitting something human beings 
care about from the objective imbued into the system. Furthermore, value 
pluralists tend to believe that there are at least some, and perhaps many, 
unresolvable moral dilemmas that result from a conflict between 
incommensurable values (further discussions in Cave et al., 2019; Baum, 
2020). 
A second problem is that even if we can identify some acceptable 
set of human values or objectives, we are rather prone to misstating these. 
This is sometimes known as the “King Midas problem” (Russell, 2019).15 
In wishing that everything he touched should turn to gold, King Midas 
thought he knew what he wanted, but he didn’t really want his wife or his 
breakfast to turn to gold. The folklore illuminates the issue of “value 
fragility”—if an AI system gets our values even slightly wrong, it could 
lead to disastrous outcomes. Hence, the more we rely on powerful 
autonomous systems, the more important it will be for us to specify their 
 
14 We say “seem” here because of the work in cross-cultural psychology over the last 
two decades which tries to show that human societies that seem to vary widely in their 
values in fact share some basic set of normative commitments (or values), even though 
the shared set may be interpreted or applied differently (e.g. Borg et al., 2019 and 
Christians, 2019). 
15 Also sometimes referred to as the “specification problem”, the “genie problem”, or 
the “Sorcerer’s Apprentice problem”.  
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goals with great care, ensuring that we express our objectives correctly 
and completely. Yet, most goals that are easy to specify will not capture 
the context-specific complexities of human objectives in the real world.16 
And indeed, AI systems frequently find ways to maximize their reward 
functions with unintended behaviours—what Bostrom (2014, 120-124) 
calls “perverse instantiations”. A nice example is given by Russell & 
Norvig (2010, 37), who imagine a vacuum robot whose performance is 
measured by the amount of dirt it cleans up. The optimal learned policy 
causes the robot to repeatedly dump and clean up the same dirt, which is 
obviously not what the designer of a vacuum intends her machine to do. 
It is not obvious, however, whether these examples of “specification 
gaming” in current systems should count as evidence that future systems 
with more advanced intelligence are also likely to behave in these ways.17  
A third reason that the value alignment problem is challenging is 
that our own values—assuming we could identify and perfectly articulate 
them—are not perfect. Human beings are far from reliably human-
friendly. If superintelligent machines merely aim to achieve our own 
standards of “human friendliness” or “friendliness to other life forms”, 
we may not be very well off (Price & Vold, 2018). Indeed, we may find 
ourselves living amongst superintelligent systems that amplify our own 
fallible, inconsistent, and complacent moral natures. Let’s call this the 
problem of human moral imperfection. A related problem emerges from 
the need to accommodate moral progress. Even if we can find a way to 
build machines that align with (only) the better parts of our current 
values, we would not want AI systems to codify these values in a way 
that prevents moral progress. After all, one does not have to look far into 
human history to see how much our values have progressed (ibid). 
 
3.4 Concluding CPAX (P4 and C3) 
P4 of CPAX states that AI systems are likely to converge upon certain 
instrumental goals that are inimical to human interests, a premise 
supported by the Instrumental Convergence Thesis (above). The idea 
 
16 See Cantwell Smith (2019) for an argument that this capacity for “deep contextual 
awareness” in our ethical judgements (i.e. to discern what norms or values apply within 
a specific fine-grained context)—a capacity that is central to virtue ethics—is 
computationally intractable.  
17 Thanks to Matthijs Maas for raising this point in discussion.  
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behind P4 is that some of the goals that intelligent systems are likely to 
converge upon will put those systems (e.g., an AI and humans) at odds 
with each other. As just one example, both Omohundro and Bostrom 
identify resource acquisition as a basic drive and an instrumental 
convergent value, respectively. In Omohundro’s view, “[a]ll computation 
and physical action requires the physical resources of space, time, matter, 
and free energy”, and hence, “almost any goal can be better 
accomplished by having more of these resources” (2008, 491). Bostrom 
(2014, 114-116) argues that, for this reason, it is likely that “an extremely 
wide range of possible final goals” would generate “the instrumental goal 
of unlimited resource acquisition”.18 Perhaps the most widely discussed 
example of this problem is Bostrom’s (2014, 123) paperclip maximizer—
a superintelligent AI system that has the goal of maximizing the 
production of paperclips. The system finds any means necessary of 
producing more paperclips, including securing any resources necessary 
for that purpose. With sufficient capacities to modify the world, soon 
enough the system could co-opt much of the Earth’s natural resources, 
including those needed for the survival of humanity, all for the purposes 
of paperclip production. The example is meant to show that even with 
good intentions and fairly innocuous goals, we could end up with AI 
systems inadvertently acting in ways that are inimical to human values. 
Another related concern is that human beings not only require resources 
to survive and flourish—we are also resources ourselves. In the Matrix 
Trilogy, for example, the AI system turns humans into an energy source 
to power itself.  
Both of these examples demonstrate how C3, which states that it 
is possible to build AI systems that pose an Xrisk, is meant to follow 
from C2 and P4. But, here we again face both a dearth of critical 
discussion and of compelling examples. Indeed, because most of the 
CPAX scenarios offered by leading defenders (e.g., Bostrom, 2014; 
Russell, 2019) are so “bemusing”,19 one is inclined to simply dismiss 
them as belonging to science fiction. More charitably, one could see them 
as toy examples, meant to illustrate a broader concern about misaligned 
powerful AI systems—a concern that we’ve tried to outline in more 
detail. While any specific scenario might be dismissed as unrealistic, the 
 
18 Similar arguments for instrumental convergence around resource acquisition can be 
found in Tegmark (2017, 266) and Russell (2019).  
19 As Leslie (2019) describes them in a critical review. 
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broader concern remains possible. It is a (very) low probability risk that 
hinges critically on certain assumptions about (a) the possible 
motivations of an advanced AI system and (b) the potential capacities 
that such a system could possess to bring about critical changes in the 
world (i.e., capacities for direct world modification). Notice as well that 
the argument only supports the (low probability) possibility of AI posing 
an indirect Xrisk. None of the scenarios discussed suggest that an AI 
system would, for example, directly eliminate the whole of the 
population.  
In closing, it’s worth noting that many think that the best way to 
mitigate the risks of the control problem is to ensure that we build the 
initial conditions of the system in a way that aligns with human values, 
thereby avoiding P4 of CPAX. For further reading, we direct readers to 
the subfields of AI safety engineering and machine ethics, both of which 
have taken on the goal of trying to find technical solutions for building 
ethically aligned systems (Cave et al., 2019).   
 
 
4.      AI Race Dynamics, Global Disruption & Xrisk 
While the earliest arguments for AI Xrisk focused on control problem 
scenarios that were based around hypothetical advanced AI systems, a set 
of recent arguments centre on a more immediate, and practically 
grounded, set of issues. One of these is the growing concern that 
advanced AI could confer significant strategic advantages to its 
possessors, and correspondingly, whether an AI race could emerge 
between powerful actors in pursuit of this technology (Dafoe, 2018; Cave 
& Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2018; Bostrom, 2014).20 In §4.1 and §4.2 we discuss 
two associated sources of structural risks that could pose indirect Xrisks 
should such an AI race dynamic arise: the first is that it could 
disincentivize researchers from investing in AI safety, and the second is 
that it could spark military conflict between AI competitors. A related 
issue gaining attention is the impact AI could have on global strategic 
stability. We take this up in §4.3, focusing on its capacity to destabilize 
nuclear deterrence, and thereby potentially contributing to military 
 
20 Geist (2016) takes a stronger view, arguing that the world superpowers are already 
locked in a particular type of racing dynamic—an AI arms race. 
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conflict escalation.  
 
4.1 AI Race Dynamics: Corner-cutting Safety  
 
An AI race between powerful actors could have an adverse effect on AI 
safety, a subfield aimed at finding technical solutions to building 
“advanced AI systems that are safe and beneficial” (Dafoe, 2018, 25; 
Cave & Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2018; Bostrom, 2017; Armstrong et al., 2016; 
Bostrom, 2014). Dafoe (2018, 43), for example, argues that it is plausible 
that such a race would provide strong incentives for researchers to trade-
off safety in order to increase the chances of gaining a relative advantage 
over a competitor.21 In Bostrom’s (2017) view, competitive races would 
disincentivize two options for a frontrunner: (a) slowing down or pausing 
the development of an AI system and (b) implementing safety-related 
performance handicapping. Both, he argues, have worrying consequences 
for AI safety. 
(a) Bostrom (2017, 5) considers a case in which a solution to the 
control problem (C1) is dependent upon the components of an AI system 
to which it will be applied, such that it is only possible to invent or install 
a necessary control mechanism after the system has been developed to a 
significantly high degree. He contends that, in situations like these, it is 
vital that a team is able to pause further development until the required 
safety work can be performed (ibid). Yet, if implementing these controls 
requires a substantial amount of additional time and resources, then in a 
tight competitive race dynamic, any team that decides to initiate this 
safety work would likely surrender its lead to a competitor who forgoes 
doing so (ibid). If competitors don’t reach an agreement on safety 
standards, then it is possible that a “risk-race to the bottom” could arise, 
driving each team to take increasing risks by investing minimally in 
safety (Bostrom, 2014, 247).  
 (b) Bostrom (2017, 5-6) also considers possible scenarios in 
which the “mechanisms needed to make an AI safe reduces the AI’s 
effectiveness”. These include cases in which a safe AI would run at a 
considerably slower speed than an unsafe one, or those in which 
implementing a safety mechanism necessitates the curtailing of an AI’s 
capabilities (ibid). If the AI race were to confer large strategic and 
 
21 Armstrong’s et al. (2016) model of an AI race dynamic supports this claim. 
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economic benefits to frontrunners, then teams would be disincentivized 
from implementing these sorts of safety mechanisms. The same, 
however, does not necessarily hold true of less competitive race 
dynamics; that is, ones in which a competitor has a significant lead over 
others (ibid). Under these conditions, it is conceivable that there could be 
enough of a time advantage that frontrunners could unilaterally apply 
performance handicapping safety measures without relinquishing their 
lead (ibid). 
It is relatively uncontroversial to suggest that reducing investment 
in AI safety could lead to a host of associated dangers. Improper safety 
precautions could produce all kinds of unintended harms from misstated 
objectives or from specification gaming, for example. They could also 
lead to a higher prevalence of AI system vulnerabilities which are 
intentionally exploited by malicious actors for destructive ends, as in the 
case of adversarial examples (see Brundage et al., 2018). But does AI 
safety corner-cutting reach the threshold of an Xrisk? Certainly not 
directly, but there are at least some circumstances under which it would 
do so indirectly. Recall that Chalmers (2010) argues there could be 
defeaters that obstruct the self-amplifying capabilities of an advanced AI, 
which could in turn forestall the occurrence of an intelligence explosion. 
Scenario (a) above made the case that a competitive AI race would 
disincentivize researchers from investing in developing safety 
precautions aimed at preventing an intelligence explosion (e.g., 
motivational defeaters). Thus, in cases in which an AI race is centred on 
the development of artificial general intelligence, a seed AI with the 
capacity to self-improve, or even an advanced narrow AI (as per §3.1), a 
competitive race dynamic could pose an indirect Xrisk insofar as it 
contributes to a set of conditions that elevate the risk of a control problem 
occurring (Bostrom, 2014, 246; 2017, 5). 
 
 4.2 AI Race Dynamics: Conflict Between AI Competitors 
 
The mere narrative of an AI race could also, under certain conditions, 
increase the risk of military conflict between competing groups. Cave & 
Ó hÉigeartaigh (2018) argue that AI race narratives which frame the 
future trajectory of AI development in terms of technological advantage 
could “increase the risk of competition in AI causing real conflict (overt 
or covert)”. The militarized language typical of race dynamics may 
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encourage competitors to view each other “as threats or even enemies” 
(ibid, 3).22 If a government believes that an adversary is pursuing a 
strategic advantage in AI that could result in their technological 
dominance, then this alone could provide a motivating reason to use 
aggression against the adversary (ibid; Bostrom, 2014). An AI race 
narrative could thus lead to crisis escalation between states. However, the 
resulting conflict, should it arise, need not directly involve AI systems. 
And it's an open question whether said conflict would meet the Xrisk 
threshold. Under conditions where it does (perhaps nuclear war), the 
contributions of AI as a technology would at best be indirect. 
 
 4.3 Global Disruption: Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrents 
 
Another type of crisis escalation associated with AI is the potential 
destabilizing impact the technology could have on global strategic 
stability;23 in particular, its capacity to destabilize nuclear deterrence 
strategies (Giest & Lohn, 2018; Rickli, 2019; Sauer, 2019; Groll, 2018; 
Zwetsloot & Dafoe, 2019). In general, deterrence relies both on states 
possessing secure second-strike capabilities (Zwetsloot & Dafoe, 2019) 
and, at the same time, on a state's inability to locate, with certainty, an 
adversary’s nuclear second-strike forces (Rickli, 2019). This could 
change, however, with advances in AI (ibid). For example, AI-enabled 
surveillance and reconnaissance systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, 
and data analysis could allow a state to both closely track and destroy an 
adversary’s previously hidden nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines (Zwetsloot & Dafoe, 2019). If their second-strike nuclear 
capabilities were to become vulnerable to a first strike, then a pre-
emptive nuclear strike would, in theory, become a viable strategy under 
certain scenarios (Giest & Lohn, 2018). 
  In Zwetsloot & Dafoe’s (2019) view, “the fear that nuclear 
systems could be insecure would, in turn, create pressures for states—
including defensively motivated ones—to pre-emptively escalate during 
a crisis”. What is perhaps most alarming is that the aforementioned AI 
systems need not actually exist to have a destabilizing impact on nuclear 
deterrence (Rickli, 2019; Groll, 2018; Giest & Lohn, 2018). As Rickli 
 
22 Here Cave & Ó hÉigeartaigh discuss Huysmans (2006). 
23 Giest & Lohn (2018, 10) define strategic stability as existing “when adversaries lack a 
significant incentive to engage in provocative behavior”.  
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(2019, 95) points out, “[b]y its very nature, nuclear deterrence is highly 
psychological and relies on the perception of the adversary’s capabilities 
and intentions”. Thus, the “simple misperception of the adversary’s AI 
capabilities is destabilizing in itself” (ibid). This potential for AI to 
destabilize nuclear deterrence represents yet another kind of indirect 
global catastrophic, and perhaps even existential, risk insofar as the 
destabilization could contribute to nuclear conflict escalation.  
  
 
     5.   Weaponization of AI  
 
Much like the more recent set of growing concerns around an AI arms 
race, there have also been growing concerns around the weaponization of 
AI. We use “weaponization” to encompass many possible scenarios, 
from malicious actors or a malicious AI itself, to the use of fully 
autonomous lethal weapons. And we will discuss each of these 
possibilities in turn. In §5.1 we discuss malicious actors and in §5.2 we 
discuss lethal autonomous weapons. We have combined this diverse 
range of scenarios for two reasons. First, while the previous Xrisk 
scenarios discussed (CPAX and an AI race) could emerge without 
malicious intentions from anyone involved (e.g., engineers or 
governments), the scenarios we discuss here do for the most part assume 
some kind of malicious intent on the part of some actor. They are what 
Zwetsloot & Dafoe (2019,) call a misuse risk. Second, the threats we 
discuss here are not particularly unique to AI, unlike those in previous 
sections. The control problem, for example, is distinctive of AI as a 
technology, in the sense that the problem did not exist before we began 
building intelligent systems. On the other hand, many technologies can 
be weaponized. In this respect, AI is no different. It is because AI is 
potentially so powerful that its misuse in a complex and high impact 
environment, such as warfare, could pose an Xrisk. 
 
5.1 Malicious Actors  
 
In discussing CPAX, we focused on accidental risk scenarios—where no 
one involved wants to bring about harm, but the mere act of building an 
advanced AI system creates an Xrisk. But AI could also be deliberately 
misused. These can include things like exploiting software 
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vulnerabilities, for example, through automated hacking or adversarial 
examples; generating political discord or misinformation with synthetic 
media; or initiating physical attacks using drones or automated weapons 
(see Brundage et al., 2018). For these scenarios to reach the threshold of 
Xrisk (in terms of ‘scope’), however, a beyond catastrophic amount of 
damage would have to be done. Perhaps one instructs an AI system to 
suck up all the oxygen in the air, to launch all the nuclear weapons in a 
nation’s arsenal, or to invent a deadly airborne biological virus. Or 
perhaps a lone actor is able to use AI to hack critical infrastructures, 
including some that manage large-scale projects, such as the satellites 
that orbit Earth. It does not take much creativity to drum up a scenario in 
which an AI system, if put in the wrong hands, could pose an Xrisk. But 
the Xrisk posed by AI in these cases is likely to be indirect—where AI is 
just one link in the causal chain, perhaps even a distal one. This 
involvement of malicious actors is one of the more common concerns 
around the weaponization of AI. Automated systems that have war-
fighting capacities or that are in anyway linked to nuclear missile systems 
could become likely targets of malicious actors aiming to cause 
widespread harm. This threat is serious, but the theoretical nature of the 
threat is straightforward relative to those posed in CPAX, for example. 
One further novel outcome of AI would be if the system itself 
malfunctions. Any technology can malfunction, and in the case of an AI 
system that had control over real-world weapons systems the 
consequences of a malfunction could be severe (see Robillard, this 
volume). We’ll discuss this potential scenario a bit more in the next 
section. A final related possibility here would be for the AI to itself turn 
malicious. This would be unlike any other technology in the past. But 
since AI is a kind of intelligent agent, there is this possibility. Cotton-
Barratt et al. (2020), for example, describe a hypothetical scenario in 
which an intelligence explosion produces a powerful AI that wipes out 
human beings in order to pre-empt any interference with its own 
objectives. They describe this as a direct Xrisk (by contrast, we described 
CPAX scenarios as indirect), presumably because they describe the AI as 
deliberately wiping out humanity. However, if the system has agency in a 
meaningful sense, such that it is making these kinds of deliberate 
malicious decisions, then this seems to assume it has something akin to 
consciousness or strong intentionality. In general we are far from 
developing anything like artificial consciousness and this is not to say 
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that these scenarios should be dismissed altogether, but many experts 
agree that there are serious challenges confronting the possibility of AI 
possessing these cognitive capacities (e.g., Searle, 1980; Koch and 
Tonini, 2017; Koch, 2019; Dehaene et al., 2017). 
 
5.2 Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
 
One other form of weaponization of AI that is sometimes discussed as a 
potential source of Xrisk are lethal autonomous weapons systems 
(LAWS). LAWS include systems that can locate, select, and engage 
targets without any human intervention (Roff, 2014; Russell, 2015; 
Robillard, this volume). Much of the debate around the ethics of LAWS 
has focused on whether their use would violate human dignity (Lim, 
2019; Rosert & Sauer, 2019; Sharkey, 2019), whether they could leave 
critical responsibility gaps in warfare (Sparrow, 2007; Robillard, this 
volume), or whether they could undermine the principles of just war 
theory, such as noncombatant immunity (Roff, 2014), for example. These 
concerns, among others, have led many to call for a ban on their use (FLI 
,2017). These concerns are certainly very serious and more near term (as 
some LAWS already exist) than the speculative scenarios discussed in 
CPAX. But do LAWS really present an Xrisk? It seems that if they do, 
they do so indirectly. Consider two possible scenarios.  
(a) One concern around LAWS is that they will ease the cost of 
engaging in war, making it more likely that tensions between rival states 
rise to military engagement. In this case, LAWS would be used as an 
instrument to carry out the ends of some malicious actor. This is because, 
for now, humans continue to play a significant role in directing the 
behaviour of LAWS, though it is likely that we will see a steady increase 
in the autonomy of future systems (Brundage et al., 2018). Now, it could 
be that this kind of warfare leads to Xrisks, but this would require a 
causal chain that includes political disruption, perhaps failing states, and 
widespread mass murder. None of these scenarios are impossible, of 
course, and they present serious risks. But we have tried to focus this 
chapter on Xrisks that are novel to AI as a technology and, even though 
we view the risks of LAWS as extremely important, they ultimately 
present similar kinds of risks as nuclear weapons do. To the extent that 
LAWS have a destabilizing impact on norms and practices in warfare, for 
example, we think that scenarios similar to those discussed in §4.3 are 
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possible—LAWS might escalate an ongoing crisis, or moreover, the 
mere perception that an adversary has LAWS might escalate a crisis. 
(b) A second scenario, described by Geoffrey Hinton, is that killer 
drones, equipped with explosives and deep learning neural net 
technology, could (somehow) learn to function independently of their 
human controllers (Robinson, 2016), and the system could then go on a 
rampage and destroy humanity. The bracketed “somehow” here is a 
critical piece of the story. Perhaps the control system has been hacked, in 
which case we are back to the malicious actor scenario described in §5.1. 
Or perhaps there is a malfunction, of the sort also described in §5.1. In 
this latter case, the malfunction could manifest in the form of a “hard 
takeoff” in which the system undergoes rapid recursive self-improvement 
(unintended by the designers) and then develops goals that are inimical to 
human interests. In such a case, we would be at the start of an 
intelligence explosion and would confront the kind of Xrisk already 
characterized by CPAX (§3). Our only point here is that upon closer 
examination, it's hard to see how this scenario looks distinct from ones 
previously discussed. Hence, the weaponization of AI can pose an 
indirect Xrisk in several different ways. In general, the more control an 
automated system has over weaponized systems that can cause real-world 
destruction, the greater risk there is of that system becoming a target for 
attack by malicious actors or of there being greater harm due to any 





Humanity is facing an increasing number of existential threats, many of 
which are of our own creation. Thankfully, there are also an increasing 
number of scholars, from a wide range of fields, studying the nature of 
these risks and strategizing how to mitigate them. But the field of Xrisk 
studies is still relatively young. There are significant debates being had 
over how to define the concept of Xrisk, how to understand its sources, 
and what methodologies should be used to assess these risks. When it 
comes to Xrisks from AI, these debates continue. Early concerns around 
AI Xrisks focused on the possibility of an intelligence explosion and the 
subsequent pathway to a scenario in which a powerful superintelligent AI 
has misaligned objectives from humanity. These concerns have not gone 
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away, but they have evolved over time. This chapter has provided an up-
to-date critical survey of these arguments, both old and new, looking at 
different foreseeable pathways towards AI Xrisk, possible global 
disruptions resulting from the emergence of an AI race dynamic between 
nations, and the weaponization of AI. In particular, we have tried to make 
the structures of each of these concerns more explicit, such that readers 
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